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SUMMARY 
 
This report studies how the composition of public revenues in terms of sources (like 
taxation, contributions to social insurance programmes, mineral rents, aid) is associated with 
different welfare regimes and social policy outcomes. It is divided into two main halves: a 
literature review and cross-national data analysis. 
The first half uses a model derived from scholarly research into the development of 
Western welfare states which identifies five explanatory factors, the “5 I’s”: industrialisation, 
interests, institutions, ideas and international influences. It applies this to the development of 
tax and revenue systems as well as welfare systems in the West, and then considers its 
applicability to the developing world. The conclusion is that the model has less purchase in 
understanding welfare and revenue systems in the developing world. Here, the patterns of 
industrialisation, interest formation and representation, institutional development, ideational 
influences and the entire international environment are very different: more complex, 
variegated and heterogeneous. Consequently, their ability to explain welfare and revenue 
systems is more indeterminate. 
The second part of this report recognises this heterogeneity by using cluster analysis 
to identify patterns in welfare regimes and revenue systems across the developing world. It 
analyses data for 65 non-OECD countries (excluding small countries) for the year 2000, 
covering welfare regimes, revenue structures, and the relationship between the two. 
The hypothesis that higher tax levels are associated with greater state effectiveness in 
meeting welfare/security needs is not clearly borne out. It is only the scope of social security 
contributions that appears to correlate with proto-welfare states in the developing world. In 
addition this cluster relies very little on revenues from minerals and oil. This proto-welfare 
state cluster comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical antecedents: the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and its bloc members and the relatively industrialized 
countries of southern South America.  
The fast-developing countries of East Asia and some other middle income countries 
in Latin America and MENA present an interesting anomalous picture in 2000. They exhibit 
relatively low shares of government social expenditures, revenues, income taxes and social 
security contributions, yet record relatively good social outputs and welfare outcomes. This 
suggests that security and illfare are mitigated by other domestic, non-state, informal or 
private institutions. This group includes several ‘developmental states’ with considerable 
infrastructure capacity but which have not prioritised traditional social policies. Here one 
might expect to see new forms of collective management of risk emerge. Indeed this can 
already be seen in some of the outliers in this group, such as Turkey, Korea and Chile. 
In contrast to this pattern, we observe a small group of countries in southern-eastern 
Africa with high spending and high tax revenues, but with poor welfare outcomes. This 
combination partly reflects the damaging effects of AIDS over the previous decade, but not 
entirely. Finally, the other major world regions, including South Asia and Africa, exhibit 
weak government and poorly functioning formal and informal security mechanisms. 
The report is subject to several important qualifications. Comparative global data on 
all these issues lags far behind the questions we want to ask. Cluster analysis is an imperfect 
art rather than a rigorous statistical technique. There are significant outliers in several of the 
clusters. Finally, the data relates to the year 2000 and thus takes no account of the quite 
extensive developments in social programmes in some countries over the last decade. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This report studies how the composition of public revenues in terms of sources (like 
taxation, social insurance contributions, mineral rents, foreign aid) is associated with different 
welfare regimes and social policy outcomes. It is divided into two main halves: literature 
reviews and cross-national data analysis. 
The first half summarises theories and research. It reviews four sets of theoretical and 
empirical literature: on the development of social policies and welfare states in the ‘West’, in 
particular in Europe; on applying these theories to the developing world; and in a parallel way 
literature on the emergence of tax and revenue systems in the West and on the relevance of 
these frameworks and findings to the South. It notes parallels and differences in the findings 
on fiscal states and welfare states, and the more striking differences between the North and 
the South. 
In the second part we develop a novel model of welfare regimes and demonstrate its 
utility as a framework for analysing social policy in the developing world. Subsequent 
sections then operationalise this framework using data for 2000 and introduce the methods of 
cluster analysis. We present a global map of welfare regimes together with supporting data 
and analysis; introduce revenue sources and map their cross-national patterns again using 
cluster analysis; and finally present our findings on the relationship between welfare regimes 
and state revenue structures. It should be stressed that this empirical analysis relates to the 
year 2000 and thus takes no account of the quite extensive developments in social 
programmes in some countries, such as Korea, Chile and China, over the last decade. 
 The conclusion asks, is there a relationship between specific revenue structures, 
regime types and welfare outcomes across the global South? It also adds qualifications and 
cautions about interpreting this type of analysis. 
 
 
 
I. THE DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE AND REVENUE SYSTEMS: 
LITERATURE ON THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
 
In this part we review existing literature on the emergence of tax and welfare regimes in the 
‘West’ or OECD world and consider their applicability to the developing world. In practice 
this means reviewing four relatively distinct sets of research on:  
• the development of social policy systems in the OECD,  
• the development of tax systems in the OECD,  
• the emergence of social policies in the developing world,  
• and the emergence of tax and revenue systems in the developing world.  
 
To do this we draw on two recent synthetic works. Gough (2008) reviews theories of Western 
welfare states and considers their relevance or otherwise for understanding social policies in 
the developing world (see also Gough and Therborn 2010). Braütigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 
(2008) similarly review theories of taxation and state-building in the West and consider their 
implications for understanding tax and revenue policies in developing countries.  
 
1.1 Determinants of welfare states in the West 
 
Gough (2008) presents a model of policy making which identifies five determinants of social 
policy. These are labeled the “five I’s”: Industrialization, Interests, Institutions, 
Ideas/Ideologies, and International Influences. A simple model of the relationship between 
these determinants and social policy ‘outputs’ is portrayed in Figure 1.  
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The following draws on a long history of case study and comparative research into social 
programmes across the OECD world, which is briefly summarized below (see Gough 2008 
for detailed arguments and citations).   
Figure 1. A Simple Model of Social Policy Making 
 Industrialization 
Changing 
economic, 
demographic and 
social structures 
Interests 
Collective actors, 
power resources, 
class movements, 
political parties 
Institutions 
Nation-building, 
citizenship, states, 
constitutions and 
political systems 
Ideas 
Culture, ideologies, epistemic 
communities, policy learning 
Social 
policy 
outputs 
Welfare 
outcomes 
International  Supra-state influences: 
War Globalization Global civil     Policy transfer Global 
   society    governance 
    Source: Gough 2008: 44  
 
 
i)  Industrialization and other macro-social changes 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant school identified social policy as a consequence 
or correlate of industrialization. The dependent variable was public social expenditure as a 
share of GDP and the relationship was demonstrated in time series and cross-sectional 
analysis. It was generally agreed that “economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic 
outcomes are the root causes of the general emergence of the welfare state” (Wilensky 
1975:xiii). The bases of European welfare state development were two: new social challenges 
and new resources to meet them. Industrial capitalism produced both. 
 The explanations of this relationship vary. Some argued that as societies develop, the 
decline of traditional forms of provision “calls forth” new public bodies and responsibilities. 
Polanyi in The Great Transformation writes of the “societal responses” to social upheavals 
brought about by the “disembedding” of labor markets from prior social relations. Industrial 
capitalism tore apart the social patterns of minimal protection of the subsistence family, the 
village, and the guilds, and it brought together large numbers of men and women outside 
traditional tutelage, in factories and new cities, creating and incessantly increasing the 
challenges of social disintegration and of social protest. Others identify the demographic 
transition that accompanies economic development and transformation as a prime mover, 
requiring public responses to growing groups like the elderly or small families. All these 
theories predict growing public social expenditures and converging social programmes in 
industrial societies.  
 
 
 
 7
ii) Interests: collective actors, power resources, democracy and parties 
A second set of explanations emerged in the 1970s moving beyond macro-social 
changes to prioritize the collective organization and powers of major social actors, notably 
social classes. In the new societies of industrial capitalism two powerful, opposite interests 
converged in generating public social policies. There was the interest of the industrial 
proletariat in at least some minimally adequate housing and social amenities in the new 
industrial cities, and in acquiring some kind of security in cases of injury, sickness, 
unemployment, old age. That interest was soon organized, in trade unions, mutual aid 
societies and labour-based parties.  On the other, there was the interest of political elites in 
social order and the quality of the population.  
A recognition of the role of class-based interests is a feature of the “social 
democratic” and the “power resources” or “democratic class struggle” models of social policy 
(Korpi 1983). In an original study of the cross-national policy perspectives of labour and 
business interests in 1881 and 1981, Therborn (1986) found (not surprisingly perhaps) the 
labour and trades union movement advocating greater state economic interventions, full 
employment policies, universal and extensive social policies and greater fiscal redistribution 
and economic equality. Business organizations favored incentives to growth, private 
provision plus low coverage of social benefits, and low redistribution. The hypothesis was 
that the distribution of power resources between the main social classes of capitalist society 
determined the extent, range and redistributive effects of economic and social policies. These 
interest-based theories have been corroborated in numerous studies (Stiller and van 
Kersbergen 2005). The upshot is that “class struggles matter” and “politics matter”. It was not 
so much the industrialization and modernization of Europe and the West that generated 
welfare states, but the way this was reflected in class cleavages, class organizations within 
civil society, their respective powers, their economic and social mobilization, and later, their 
parliamentary representation. A crucial factor has been the emergence of ideologically-based 
parties pursuing a class-based program of reform, in place of clientelist or personalized 
parties. 
Nevertheless, the power resources approach could not explain the early introduction 
of social policies by non-class-based parties, or the subsequent emergence of strong but 
different welfare systems in countries with relatively weak unions and social democratic 
parties, but strong Christian Democrat parties. This complexity was combined in Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) influential work on welfare state regimes, which identified not two but 
three worlds of “welfare capitalism”: liberal, social democratic and conservative or Christian 
democratic. 
 
iii)  Institutions: states, constitutions and political systems 
A third group of theories claim that political institutions mediate the impact of 
societal interests and/or interpret the welfare state as a ‘final stage’ of state building. 
Institutions turned challenges, resources, and interests into consolidated, self-reproducing 
realities. The welfare state is part of a longer-term process by which power is accumulated in 
nation states by building state capacities, collecting taxes and constructing citizenship. While 
Marshall (1950) saw the welfare state as the extension of citizenship rights to include social 
rights, European scholars, notably Stein Rokkan, developed a much more extensive 
theorization of the welfare state as a final stage in nation-building in Europe (Flora 1999). 
The role of social policy institutions in the building of nation states and welfare states has 
long been acknowledged. For one thing, a welfare state requires an effective tax state, as 
Schumpeter (1918/1991) long ago recognized. In several countries there was an overarching 
drive toward welfare statism, as in Bismarck’s Germany where social insurance in the 1880s 
provided a social motor to consolidate the unification of 1870/71 (Rimlinger 1971). In several 
federal countries today, the welfare state can act as a force for unity: when secession 
threatens, the welfare state can act as a lightning rod for articulation of interests and provide 
compensation for socio/ethno-territorial divisions and inequalities (Obinger et al 2005).  
By the late 1980s a “new” institutionalism had entered comparative research on social 
policy development. One important strand identifies the centralization of decision making at 
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the summit of political systems and the extent to which the executive is insulated from 
parliamentary and electoral pressures as important to the development of extensive social 
policies. If power is dispersed and there are many veto points, then relatively small and well-
organized groups can block the systemic changes required to radically reform health or social 
security programs (see Bonoli 2000). Thus federal systems (see Obinger et al 2005), or 
constitutional separation of powers, hinder the development of welfare states; doubly so if 
both are present. Another strand emphasizes the bureaucratic legacies of past social programs; 
the way that public teachers and health workers, for example, or new “clienteles”, such as old 
age pensioners, can mobilize to defend and extend social programs and benefits (Pierson 
2000, Flora 1986-7).  
 
iv) Ideas: culture, ideologies and epistemic communities  
The above three factors were combined into a popular synthesis (see eg. Huber et al 
1993). Yet they omit one factor commonly emphasised in the 19th century—the role of ideas 
and their influence on reforming elites. Three levels, varying from more to less abstract, can 
be distinguished here: the role of a) cultural systems; b) ideas and dominant ideologies; and c) 
epistemic communities and policy transfer (Haas 1992). Formative ideas behind the 
emergence and development of European welfare states included the European rights 
tradition, British social Liberalism and French post-revolutionary Republicanism, Social 
Democracy and social Catholicism. Later inputs came from Keynesian economics, though 
this harmony between economy and social policy is commonly perceived to have broken 
down with the challenge of monetarism in the 1970s (Mishra 1984). Now, however, theories 
of “human capital” and “productive social policy” provide further ideational support. Thus, 
social policies were not and are not solely about redistribution. Some policies, such as early 
school meals provision in Britain, have always been perceived as performing a productive 
public good role.  
 
v) International and supra-state influences on policy making 
The former accounts all share a focus on internal factors in explaining the emergence 
of national welfare states in OECD countries. The only exception to this until recently was a 
recognition of the impact of war on social policy, notably the decisive role of World War II in 
the emergence of “big government”, high taxes and extensive welfare states. But relatively 
little has been made of comparative differences in the war experiences of nations, between 
victors and vanquished, and between those countries occupied or fought over and those not.  
Apart from this, the external environment – for example, the post-war settlement of 
the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions – has been taken for granted, 
and for the first three decades was mainly benevolent. Only recently has the impact and 
constraints of trans-national and supra-national factors on the making of social policy come to 
be recognized with the discourse and part-reality of “globalisation”. The dominant 
hypothesised impact on the welfare states of the West was initially negative: the retrenchment 
of uncompetitive welfare states, a “race to the bottom” in taxation, regulation, state 
responsibilities, social rights and redistribution (Mishra 1999). However, the clear results of 
empirical research are surprising: contrary to the “race to the bottom” story, the share of 
social expenditure in GDP positively correlates with openness to trade across the OECD, and 
this link appears to be growing in strength (Cameron 1978, Rodrik 1998, Garrett 1998).  
  
1.2 Lessons for Developing Countries 
 
To what extent, if at all, does this model help understand the extent, patterns and dynamics of 
social policy in the developing world? What follows provides a few brief comments on this 
big question. 
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i) Industrialisation and post-industrialism: economic and social conditions and 
change 
The importance of societal conditions and structural change remain central to 
understanding social policy in the developing world. Industrialization explanations are likely 
to remain relevant in the newly emerging “workshops of the world”, particularly in Asia. But 
in most of the emerging market economies the growing secondary sector is combined with 
larger tertiary and primary sectors than were European societies in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries - with implications for growth, taxation, labor market security and the applicability 
of the European social insurance model. Above all, the pervasive dualism of developing 
economies, the gulf between major cities and rural areas, and the extensive spatial 
inequalities, is beyond comparison with Europe now and Europe a century ago.  
Furthermore, most of the non-Western world has never experienced the long post-war 
booms interspersed, until now, with only mild recessions, which formed a benign 
environment for the rise of European welfare states. Plummeting commodity markets, 
financial crises, and demographically overburdened stagnations have haunted it most of the 
time. The more successful exceptions, like Japan and later South Korea, have witnessed 
burgeoning social policies, but still far short of European levels. 
It is true that an unprecedented demographic transition is underway across much of 
the world, which suggests dramatic new ‘requirements’ for schools, pensions and health 
services. Yet the role of families and households in attempting to mitigate risk and secure 
welfare is also far more extensive in the developing than in the developed world. The 
development process today is squashed in time, is highly uneven, and is more constrained by 
global economic developments than in the 19c and early 20c (see below). All these factors 
complicate any simple transposition of lessons from European industrialisation to the 
developing world.  
 
ii) Interests 
Both the interests of social rights and the interests of social fear are weaker outside 
Europe. This is mainly because societies are much more fragmented: between urban and rural 
areas, within large agrarian sectors (between labourers and peasants), and within urban areas, 
between formal and informal employment. On some exceptional occasions progressive 
coalitions may arise, but such coalescence of interests has been difficult to sustain in 
consistent policies and institutions.  
In the zones of global accumulation, notably East Asia, proletarianization proceeds at 
breakneck speed, and has fostered unofficial trade unions and militant class struggle in 
uneven ways. In such countries, one might predict the classic European “social insurance 
dynamic” (Hort and Kuhnle 2000): social insurance begins with groups of manual and factory 
workers in large industrial firms, gradually rippling outwards to include medium and small 
enterprises, agricultural, white-collar and service workers, the self-employed, and later, in 
some countries, even the unemployed and housewives. However, this lesson is not applicable 
where capitalist development is not accompanied by proletarianisation, and not necessarily 
where it is. The labour movement is almost everywhere weak or non-existent, squeezed 
between repression and deregulation. The growing structural power of capital and its 
willingness to exert agency power also contributes a bias against comprehensive welfare 
systems. 
 
iii) Institutions 
Institutions have traveled across the world, including the nation-state and social 
insurance, but nowhere has a European-style welfare state emerged. However, the role of 
welfare systems in extending citizenship as a later phase of state and nation-building in 
Europe has some parallels in the global South: from the development of social protection 
policies in the face of the 1930s depression in the Southern Cone of Latin America, to the 
ambitious plans for welfare states in newly independent ex-colonies such as Sri Lanka and 
Ghana, to the concessionary social programs to stem revolutionary pressures such as the 
Philippines in the early 1950s. There is a need for a more comparative study of these paths, of 
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their very different antecedents1 and of the forms of social citizenship on offer. However, all 
these cases presuppose state institutions with certain minimal capacities and legitimacy: a 
welfare state presupposes a reasonably functioning Weberian state. Where states are failed, 
“shadow” or collapsed, this cannot happen.  
A related question concerns the export of Western-style democracy across the world, 
notably since 1990, and its impact on pressures for social programmes. However, there is no 
simple link between the spread of ‘democracy’ and the emergence of real social rights. In 
East Asia authoritarian leaders have introduced social policies to strengthen national 
solidarity, secure the loyalty of elites and legitimize undemocratic regimes. Moreover, 
democracy has also fostered the clientelistic political machine, initially in the USA – deals 
whereby citizens trade votes for access to employment and transfers. Clientelism is now a 
pervasive feature shaping the nature of, and access to, welfare programmes across the world.  
The impact of constitutional structures on social policy development is difficult to 
discern from research undertaken in the OECD. One lesson from a comparative study of 
health care in Europe and the United States is that universal social programs and rights are 
blocked when providers and private interests organize ahead of consumers and civil 
organizations. This is a critical lesson at a time when privatization policies encourage private 
providers, giving them an institutional “head start” over consumers and citizens. 
 
iv) Ideas 
Outside Europe, and its settler off-shoots, there is no tradition of civic or popular 
rights to draw upon. But there are powerful ideas of social justice within Islamic, African and 
Gandhian cultures, for instance. The emergence of proto-welfare states in East Asia has also 
prompted the study of the “Confucian welfare state”: a “fundamentally different orientation to 
social policy” to the West and “an independent path of welfare state evolution in East Asia” 
(Rieger and Leibfried 2003: 261). In late 20th century Latin America, an indigenous transplant 
of social Catholicism, the Theology of Liberation has played a significant role, in Brazil 
above all.   
Many countries have pursued roads to modernity different from T.H. Marshall´s idea 
of social citizenship following upon political citizenship. Rather, they have followed a much 
more central idea of national development, recognised in recent research on the 
developmental state. This was pioneered by Japan under pressure to catch up with Europe 
whilst maintaining national cohesion. The Japanese project presupposed a strong, externally 
threatened but not defeated national culture, capable of overwhelming class conflict. This 
model still has some appeal, but the dominant source of ideas over the last three decades has 
been neo-liberalism, promulgated by Western governments and intergovernmental 
organisations. 
 
v) International influences 
It is when considering the impact of other global factors that the ability of European 
history to offer any useful lessons is most severely tested. The developing world today is 
enmeshed in a network of economic relationships with powerful financial and corporate 
actors, is part of a world society of inter-governmental institutions with powers to constrain 
and sometimes control Southern governments, and is subject to ruling ideas and ideologies 
promulgated by powerful epistemic communities, notably that of economists.  
Contrary to naïve interpretations of globalisation, the world’s most generous welfare 
states have developed in societies wide open to and heavily dependent on the world market, 
such as Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavia. Unlike in the West, where social protection 
emerged early on as the only alternative to trade protection, in much of the developing world 
the necessary state infrastructure has been destroyed by neoliberal reforms promulgated by 
international institutions and powerful states. The sequencing in the South is too often the 
                                                 
1 Such as Therborn’s (1995) ‘four roads to modernity’ – pioneers, ‘settler’ countries, colonies, and independent-
but-constrained nation states. 
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opposite of that in the North: globalization has preceded welfare state formation and previous 
forms of national economic protectionism have been forcibly swept aside before even a 
rudimentary system of social protection has been put in place. 
In terms of policy transfer and learning, Europe’s experience offers ambivalent 
lessons. Studies of the influence of the Bank and other external actors on pension reforms in 
the transitional countries of Eastern Europe have found that, even in such vulnerable states, 
domestic interests and institutions strongly mediate external policy advice and pressures. 
However, many highly indebted low-income countries in the South lack the power and 
institutional capacities to adapt international policy models to their contexts.  Policy transfer 
imposed by fiat or threat of heavy penalties or conditionality is very different from policy 
learning—indeed, they can be mutually exclusive. This is a novel barrier to the emergence of 
autonomous social policy in much of the South. 
The tide within intergovernmental institutions may now be turning. International 
organizations have been very important conveyors of ideas, of different kinds. The ILO has 
importantly inspired formal sector labour rights. The UN, from its l974 Women´s Conference 
in Mexico has spread ideas of gender equality, and the UN Convention of the Rights of the 
Child and its permanent child-focused organization UNICEF are highlighting children’s well-
being. Deacon (2007) provides a detailed account of the debates and contests between inter-
governmental organisations, including between the UN family and the more powerful Bretton 
Woods institutions. There is some evidence that crass anti-welfare stances are being modified 
in the light of experience, but no evidence to date of an emerging ‘progressive programme of 
global social policy’.  
 
1.3 Determinants of the tax state in the West and implications for the developing 
world  
 
Can we replicate the model above applied to the tax state? Do the “5 I’s” illuminate the 
structure and policies of tax states as well as the structure and policies of welfare states? If so, 
we have a powerful framework for understanding their relationships. We shall argue that the 
model is indeed applicable, drawing on Braütigam, Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) where similar 
conceptual categories are deployed. Rather than replicating the above structure, with separate 
literature reviews for Europe and the West and the developing world, the two are combined 
here. 
 
i) Industrialisation and development 
The association of greater proportionate tax revenues with higher levels of economic 
development is a robust finding across both time and space – a relationship first noticed by 
Adolf Wagner in the 19c and named after him. ‘Official tax-collectors in richer countries, and 
especially in countries with a relatively small agricultural sector, succeed in capturing higher 
proportions of national income for the government’ (Moore 2008: 40). However, there is still 
much variation in tax revenue unaccounted for by income per head, and the reasons for the 
relationship are disputed. Wagner himself, and several social policy scholars noted above, 
explain it in terms of industrial society fostering new needs and demands for public services. 
Others credit the spread of the formal economy which enables records to be kept and taxes to 
be collected in a more uniform and bureaucratic way (Ardant 1975, Brewer 1989). There is in 
fact no contradiction between these two explanations which can be subsumed within the 
‘modernisation’ framework discussed above. 
Economic development, as well as expanding tax revenues, also brings with it a shift 
in the nature of taxation: ‘from levying taxes on specific items (salt, tobacco, carriages, 
individuals) to levying them according to accounting categories (income, sales, turnover 
valued-added, profits)’ (Moore 2008: 40). Moore claims that in the developed world this has 
been accompanied by a shift from coercion to contract in the tax relationship. Coercive 
taxation is characterised by arbitrary assessment, coercive collection and the absence of any 
representation for taxpayers in tax policy decisions. Contract taxation is characterised by 
‘revenue bargaining’ – the exchange of tax revenues (for the state) for institutionalized 
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influence over public policy (for citizens)’ (Moore 2008: 36). However, this transition cannot 
be assumed in the South (nor in parts of the North). Rather, this points to the role of interests 
and institutions, the second and third factors in our model, in mediating the relationship 
between economic development and tax revenues. 
 
ii) Interests 
That the pattern of taxes normally reflects the interests of the powerful is perhaps too 
obvious a point to make, though it has rarely been subjected to scholarly investigation 
(Braütigam 2008). Similarly the ability of taxes that are perceived to be unjust or coercive to 
foster tax rebellions is a part of the historical record, from the Roman Empire to the Poll Tax 
revolt against the Thatcher government in Britain. Thus there is a complex link between 
interest groups, perceived interests and the tax system. The direction of causality is difficult to 
disentangle. There is an interesting debate over the extent to which undemocratic 
governments imposing tax hikes foster demands for democratic reforms. Ross (2004) argues 
that if an undemocratic government raises the tax burden without a commensurate increase in 
desired services, then citizens tend to press for greater representation. Lieberman (2003) has 
researched the ways that race and class determine bargaining power over taxes and public 
expenditures in Brazil and South Africa. He notes how a cross-class alliance among whites in 
South Africa fostered higher income tax levels and higher benefit levels (for whites) – a 
pattern we shall observe below.  
 
iii) Institutions 
The role of taxation in building states is a common theme among students of the state. 
‘The history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution of the state’ (Levi, 
1988). We have already noted Schumpeter’s analysis. Michael Mann’s immense historical 
study of power emphasises the role of tax-raising powers (1993, notably chapter 11).  
Braütigam (2008: 1) writes: ‘Taxation may play the central role in building and sustaining the 
power of states, and shaping their ties to society’. Though theoretical explanations of this 
relationship differ, all agree that the administrative, fiscal and institutional capacity of 
governments to pursue public goals both engenders and reflects tax raising-powers. Here the 
parallels between institutional determinants of welfare state and tax state are very strong. 
Yet, more detailed studies of political institutions reveal different associations with 
tax levels. Gerring et al (2005) found that countries with ‘centripetal’ constitutions, whose 
incentive for ‘voice’ rather than ‘veto’ (political systems that were unitary rather than federal, 
parliamentary rather than presidential, and list-proportional rather than first-past-the-post) 
could collect higher levels of taxes (cited in Braütigam 2008: 10-11). Steinmo (1993) relates 
the differences in tax systems between Sweden, the US and Britain according to features of 
their constitutions, electoral rules etc, in a related way to the studies of Pierson and Immergut 
on welfare policies noted above. The extent of variability among Southern states is likely to 
be greater still. 
Again, the impact of democracy on tax revenues is disputed for developing countries. 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) finds that autocracies have higher levels of taxation than 
democracies, whereas Thies (2004) finds the opposite. This is similar to the contradictory 
findings on the links between democracy and the origins of social policies, noted above. 
These findings suggest that there is no automatic link between the emergence of state systems 
and revenue-raising powers across the global South. 
 
iv) Ideas 
The influence of culture, dominant ideas and policy learning also features in the 
literature on tax systems. For example cultural values have an independent effect, as when 
public spiritedness or cultures of giving such as zakat foster a greater willingness to pay taxes. 
Tax compliance is affected by the perceived legitimacy of the government. This merges into a 
more instrumental account of tax compliance: ‘Countries with sizeable shadow economies or 
informal sectors have lower tax morale, as people in the formal sector can more easily 
observe large numbers of others escaping the tax net’ (Alm and Torgler 2004). Levi’s finding 
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in some European countries that a belief in the welfare state makes people more willing to 
pay taxes, reminds us again of the close link between tax states and welfare states – if only in 
the most developed European welfare states (Levi 1988: 52). The emergence of ‘revenue 
bargaining’ cements this link. However, the widespread acceptance of the need to pay taxes 
may rest on a prior political settlement between major interest groups. Interests can shape 
ideas. 
 
v) International influences 
The impact of war on the development of the European tax state is prominent and 
much researched. According to Tilly (1985), war made the state: it requires both 
administrative capacities and taxes. For this reason, preparation for war and war-fighting has 
also fostered popular demands for accountability and for parliaments to represent the tax 
payers. Thies (2005) extends this argument to the existence of external threats to a state and 
also to internal threats from rival elites. Peacock and Wiseman’s (1961) ‘plateau’ effect then 
demonstrates that war-time levels of taxation and spending persist into peacetime. 
Aside from war, international influence is the arena, claims Moore, where the past 
fiscal history of Europe and the OECD offers the fewest lessons to the developing world. 
Unlike the core OECD states, the developing world today exists in a transformed international 
environment which profoundly reduces their dependence on domestic tax-payers for revenue. 
This is for four main reasons. First, many developing countries are in receipt of large non-tax 
revenues from natural resources which are in demand due to the emergence of a global 
economy. This provides these governments with natural resource rents and reduces their 
reliance on taxation.2 Second, for many other poor countries foreign aid from donors provides 
a second external revenue stream. Both of these large revenue streams ‘were not available to 
governments when the OECD countries were comparably poor’ (Moore 2008: 34). Many 
argue that these streams create a ‘resource curse’ and ‘aid dependency’ respectively. In turn, 
they argue, this fosters patronage, waste and graft, and renders governments illegitimate, 
ineffective and unaccountable.  
Third, reliance on external revenues undermines the social contract and revenue 
bargaining and encourages middle-class exit into private and overseas welfare markets. 
‘Unless the middle class is also catered for by state provision, good quality social provision 
can’t be sustained’ (Deacon 2007: 172). But to bind in the middle classes, if not the elite, 
requires a willingness to pay taxes, which is undermined if taxation of mineral wealth, or aid, 
or other grants from abroad, weakens this social bond, or if private options are easily 
available. ‘The proposition is that the dependence of governments on broad taxation for 
revenue is good for the quality of governance’ (Moore: 34). Finally the IMF and other IGOs 
have played an unprecedented role in guiding and enforcing fiscal policies in the developing 
world, with no parallel in the ‘emerging market economies’ of the North in the 19c and 20c. 
 
We can draw a mixed conclusion from this survey for the prospects for effective, 
sustainable and non-coercive taxes in the developing world. On the one hand, economic and 
political development is likely to foster less coercive taxation and greater revenues. ‘Coercive 
taxation is especially likely where ruling elites are unrestrained by their subjects…; 
economies are poor, rural, agrarian and subsistence’ (Moore 2008: 62). On the other hand, the 
absence of clearly represented interest groups and political settlements, the permeability of 
political institutions, the reliance on rents and aid, the intrusion of the IMF and the resultant 
‘dependent learning’, all undermine the development of effective governance via revenue 
bargaining, and the ability to raise sustainable tax revenues.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
                                                 
2 Since this is the subject of the report by Hinojosa et al (2008) we do not consider it in detail here. 
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To what extent does this survey of two disparate scholarly literatures tell a similar 
story? What are the implications for the development of tax states and welfare states in the 
developing world? 
First, the development and industrialisation explanation holds some truth: both tax 
and social spending shares are associated with levels of national income per head. This can be 
explained from both the spending side (to meet new ‘social needs’ and demographic 
pressures) and the revenue side (the ability of states more effectively to levy taxes in 
emerging market economies). However, this relationship leaves much variation unexplained 
and is mediated by other factors. Furthermore it is severely qualified in today’s developing 
world by several factors. First, the pervasive dualism of developing economies, the gulf 
between major cities and rural areas, and the extensive spatial inequalities, is beyond 
comparison with Europe now and Europe a century ago. The role of families and households 
in attempting to mitigate risk and secure welfare is also far more extensive in the developing 
than in the developed world. Finally, the international economic environment is very different 
and in general less benign than the post-war period of Western welfare states. 
Second, the role of countervailing interests and ‘pressures from below’ in shaping 
welfare and tax systems is more complex and indeterminate than the history of the West 
records. This is partly the result of the dualisms and fragmentation noted above. In addition, 
trades unions and labour-based political organisations have been squeezed between repression 
and deregulation and thus weakened. Business and financial interests exert more structural 
and agency power. The ability of other collective ‘horizontal’ sources of identity and 
mobilisation to substitute for this is unproven. None of this rules out an emerging collective 
interest in expanding rights-based welfare, but it makes it less likely. 
Third, the role of the welfare state and the tax state in European state-building has 
some parallels in developing countries with effective states, such as in East Asia. Here one 
might expect to see the parallel expansion of state social programmes, spending and taxation. 
However, in poorer world regions the state-building process has been stalled by a variety of 
factors, including the intervention of powerful external actors. A welfare state must 
presuppose a minimal Weberian state. Similarly, democracy has an ambiguous effect on the 
tax-welfare state: the conflicting evidence points to an undetermined relationship mediated by 
other factors. 
Fourth, the cultural variety of the developing world exceeds that found within the 
homelands of the welfare state; its import is still not fully understood. Quite new ideas 
supportive of an active state have emerged within parts of the developing world, notably that 
of the ‘developmental state’ in Japan and East Asia, but this does not usually entail an 
extensive tax and welfare state. In much of the world, dualist economies and clientelist 
politics foster low tax morale and undermine willingness to pay taxes and use public services. 
Finally, the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism (which has now reached its limits) has 
blocked indigenous welfarist ideas and imposed ‘dependent learning’.  
Fifth, the global environment has utterly changed since the first industrial 
transformations in the 19c and the first three quarters of the 20c. Here the ability of European 
history to offer any useful lessons is most severely tested. The developing world today is 
enmeshed in a network of economic relationships with powerful financial and corporate 
actors exerting structural power, is part of a world society of inter-governmental institutions 
with powers to constrain and sometimes control Southern governments, and is subject to 
ruling ideas and ideologies promulgated by powerful epistemic communities, including that 
of economists. Globalisation has provided in certain countries streams of rent and aid monies 
not available to Western countries in their modernisation phase, which can undermine the 
scope for domestic taxation and domestic welfare institutions. For the past three decades the 
diverse domestic roads to the institution we now label ‘the welfare state’ were replaced by a 
global one-size-fits-all road, mapped and laid down outside the countries concerned, though 
this neo-liberal model is now slowly breaking up.  
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All these contrasts constrain the emergence of tax and social policies in the 
developing world – and the lessons which can be learned from the earlier histories in the 
West. 
To deal with this variety, complexity and under-determination we go on to develop a 
distinctive conceptual framework and methodology in the remainder of this report. 
 
 
II. WELFARE AND REVENUE REGIMES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
AN EMPIRICAL CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
One underlying lesson from European social policy is the importance of path 
dependency: how, once established, patterns or constellations of social policies tend to 
reproduce and are rather impervious to radical change, short of encountering a major crisis or 
external intervention. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues this most forcefully in his influential 
framework of welfare state regimes, which has received considerable empirical confirmation. 
Recently, Gough and Wood extended this framework to identify a wider range of “welfare” 
regimes (distinguished from welfare state regimes) across the developing world (Gough and 
Wood et al 2004; Gough 2004; Wood and Gough 2006). In what follows we apply this 
approach to the study of welfare regimes and revenue structures.  
 
2.1 The regime framework 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) developed the welfare regime framework as middle-range 
theory. Studying developed, capitalist, democratic nations, he argued that there are 
“qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and the family” and rejected 
simplistic rankings on one dimension: “The linear scoring approach (more or less power, 
democracy or spending) contradicts the sociological notion that power, democracy, or welfare 
are relationally structured phenomena.…. Welfare-state variations.. are not linearly 
distributed, but clustered by regime types” (Esping-Anderson 1990:26).  
Though there have been attempts to apply the regime framework to other parts of the 
world, including Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and East Asia, these all adopt the 
original conceptual framework developed to understand the OECD world (e.g. Lee and Ku 
2007). In contrast, Gough and Wood contend that to apply this paradigm to the nations and 
peoples of the global South requires a radical re-conceptualisation in order to recognize the 
very different realities across the world.  
In essence, there must be a broadening of focus from welfare state regimes to welfare 
regimes. First, the welfare mix must be extended beyond ‘the welfare state’, financial and 
other markets, and family/household systems. The important role of community-based 
relationships must be recognized, ranging from local community practices to NGOs and 
clientelist networks. In addition, the role of international actors cannot be ignored as it often 
has been in the welfare state literature: this embraces aid, loans and their conditions from 
international governmental organizations, the actions of certain transnational markets and 
companies, the interventions of international NGOs, and even the cross-border spread of 
households via migration and remittances. The result is an extended welfare mix or 
institutional responsibility matrix as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Components of the Institutional Responsibility Matrix or Welfare Mix 
 National Supra-national and extra-national 
State National and local government; quasi-
governmental institutions 
 
International governmental 
organisations, national donors 
Market Domestic markets and economic actors 
 
Global markets, multi-national 
corporations 
Community Community practices and 
organisations, NGOs 
 
International NGOs 
Household Household transfers, services and 
strategies 
International household transfers, 
services and strategies 
Source: Gough 2004: 30. 
 
In addition, second, the ‘de-commodification’ of labor has less salience as a measure 
of security in societies where labor markets are imperfect and livelihoods diffuse and a wider 
range of indicators needs to be employed. Third, political mobilizations in many developing 
countries are more diffuse and particularistic with less intentional impacts on state policies; 
indeed, the state is more weakly differentiated from other power systems.  
On this basis, Gough and Wood (2004) posit the existence of two meta-welfare 
regimes in the modern world alongside the welfare state regime: an informal security regime 
and an insecurity regime. 
Informal security regimes describe institutional arrangements where people rely 
heavily on markets, community and family relationships to meet their security needs (though 
to greatly varying degrees). These relationships can be hierarchical and asymmetrical. This 
often results in problematic inclusion or ‘adverse incorporation’, whereby poorer people 
acquire some short-term assistance at the expense of longer-term vulnerability and 
dependence (Wood 2004). The underlying patron-client relations are then reinforced and can 
prove extremely resistant to civil society pressures and social policy reforms along welfare 
state lines. Nevertheless, these relations comprise a series of informal ‘rights’ and afford some 
measure of security. 
Insecurity regimes describe institutional arrangements which block the emergence 
even of stable informal security mechanisms, and thus generate gross levels of insecurity and 
poor welfare outcomes. These regimes often arise in areas of the world where powerful 
external actors interact with and reproduce weak state forms, conflict and political instability 
(Bevan 2004). The result is a circle of insecurity, vulnerability and suffering for all but a 
small elite and their enforcers and clients.  
This theoretical model of three meta-regimes is more general than the original 
welfare state regime framework, but it does retain the theoretical corollary of path 
dependence. Notwithstanding the unifying and converging forces of global capitalism, it 
emphasizes the variegated and path-dependent patterns of development or underdevelopment 
across different zones of the world. It holds out the promise of a parsimonious 
conceptualization and understanding of human insecurity and welfare in the contemporary 
world, which yet does not force inappropriate categories and systems of thought on the 
immensely diverse range of countries in the modern world. 
  
2.2 Operationalising and Analysing Welfare Regimes 
 
The regime concept rests on the idea that linear scoring approaches do not capture the 
systemic realities of country welfare or illfare systems because variations are not linearly 
 17
distributed. The appropriate method for testing this hypothesis is cluster analysis. The 
analysis presented in this section and the next summarises a more detailed analysis in Abu 
Sharkh and Gough (2010). 
 
Methods: cluster analysis 
 
There are two major techniques of cluster analysis - hierarchical cluster analysis 
(HCA) and k-means cluster analysis (KCA) – and we use both here. This is unusual since 
most recent studies in comparative social policy use only HCA (e.g. Hinojosa et al 2008). 
Hierarchical cluster analysis identifies relatively homogeneous groups of cases 
according to the selected variables based on an algorithm that starts with each case in a 
separate cluster and combines clusters until all cases form a single cluster. The results are 
usually presented in the form of dendograms: ‘a visual representation of the steps in a 
hierarchical clustering solution that shows the clusters being combined and the values of the 
distance coefficients at each step. Connected vertical lines designate joined cases. The 
dendogram rescales the actual distances to numbers between 0 and 25, preserving the ratio of 
the distances between steps’. Dendograms ‘can be used to assess the cohesiveness of the 
clusters formed and can provide information about the appropriate number of clusters to keep. 
Yet the final choice of the number of clusters is something of a judgment call. In addition, the 
HCA technique assigns countries to clusters in a hierarchical way – once assigned they cannot 
change the cluster they belong to. 
To improve this judgement, we use at a second stage k-means cluster analysis. This is 
designed to identify relatively homogeneous groups of cases based on selected characteristics, 
using an algorithm that requires one to specify the number of clusters in advance. Compared 
to HCA it permits the recombination of cases and clusters over repeated iterations – an 
important advantage. Initial cluster centres form by assigning each case in turn to the cluster 
with the closest centre and then updating the centre, until final cluster centres are identified. 
The pre-specified number of clusters can be generated by theories or by previous 
observations. 
In this study we use the two techniques in sequence. We begin with dendograms 
generated by HCA and observe the number of major clusters these identify. At the next stage 
we specify that number of clusters in the KCA analysis. In practice the procedure is not so 
neat and a variety of k-means around that number must be tried to cater for outlier countries 
which require a cluster of their own to reduce the variability of the larger clusters.  
KCA also generates many useful statistics. The distance between cluster centres 
enables one to relate clusters according to their proximity to others. The analysis of variance 
F statistic provides information about each variable's contribution to the separation of the 
groups (though these statistics are opportunistic since the procedure tries to form groups that 
do differ). We used this information to discriminate in favour of cluster results where each 
variable contributes more equally to cluster discrimination. 
Cluster analysis is a time-consuming process: numerous runs must be undertaken 
varying according to the variables included (entailing a trade-off between validity and 
coverage) and the number of k-means clusters identified. It is also important to note that it is a 
descriptive not an analytical statistical technique so it cannot directly explain the patterns 
uncovered. 
 
Countries included  
 
In this report we exclude the OECD world and concentrate our attention on the 
remaining countries, for two reasons. First, there are numerous studies of government revenue 
structures and of welfare regimes in the developed world, whereas research into the global 
South is much sparser. Second, we wished to relate government taxation and revenues to 
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country welfare regimes drawing on our previous paper which also excluded the original 
member states of the OECD.  
Also, in order to exclude large numbers of smaller states, countries with a population 
of less than 3 million people were excluded. This left potentially 127 countries which report 
data or let the UN or World Bank ‘negotiate’ data with the country. However, variations in 
data availability restricted the final number of countries to 65 or less (see Abu-Sharkh and 
Gough, 2010).  
 
Variables 
 
This report restricts itself to the two major dimensions of welfare regimes originally 
theorised by Esping-Andersen: the welfare mix and welfare outcomes. The welfare mix 
describes the entire pattern of resources and programmes that can act to enhance welfare or 
security in a nation state. To operationalize this across the non-OECD world is exceptionally 
difficult, not least because of lack of data. Thus we could find no valid, reliable and 
comparative measures of: privately provided pensions and services (except for health 
purchases); community and NGO-provided welfare; the role of households and wider kin 
groups, except for overseas remittances; and little on the role and influence of transnational 
actors, except aid donors. Given this unfortunate fact, we are reduced to inferring the nature 
of informal and insecurity regimes from the data that is available, to which we now turn. 
To capture the extent of governmental and public responsibility for critical social 
resources, we use two pairs of variables covering expenditure/revenues and service delivery. 
This reflects the concern of Esping-Andersen (1990) that public expenditure is a poor 
indicator of welfare regimes. We must perforce rely on this given data inadequacies in 
developing countries, but we are able to complement it with information on public service 
outputs (to be distinguished from welfare outcomes below). The first pair are: 
• public spending on education and health as a share of GDP 
• social security contributions as a share of total government revenues (as a proxy for 
provision of social insurance benefits).  
The second pair are: 
• immunization against measles: a fairly restricted social policy target 
• secondary school enrolment of females: a higher, more extensive output target.  
To represent international aspects of the welfare mix we have measures of two external 
transfer flows:  
• official aid 
• remittances from overseas migrants.  
 
To measure welfare outcomes we wanted to use the classic human development 
indicators of life expectancy, literacy and poverty. However, because of doubts about the 
reliability of poverty estimates we relied on the first two indices: 
• life expectancy at birth 
• the illiteracy rate of young people aged 15-24 years.  
 
 
2.3 Welfare Regimes: Cluster Results 
 
Table 1 shows the clusters generated using the above variables and k-means 
clustering with k=10. In 2000, we find eight clusters with four or more country members. 
These clusters are ordered in this and the following tables by comparing the distances 
between final cluster centres, starting with the cluster that most resembles OECD welfare 
states: the cluster with the highest scores for public expenditure, public provision and welfare 
outcomes labelled A. Most remote from this cluster are clusters H, G and F. The upper part of 
the table shows the mean values for each variable by cluster. 
 19
Table 1 
Cluster means and country membership, 2000 
Cluster identifier A B C D E F G H 
No of countries 14 16 7 5 5 7 5 4 
Aid per capita/ GNI  0,81 2,08 2,98 2,59 6,22 3,96 12,05 27,19 
Workers' remittances/ GNI 0,64 0,66 9,20 0,03 0,34 1,54 2,30 0,99 
Public expenditure on health + education/ GDP 9,35 6,77 5,77 8,63 4,35 4,80 5,44 5,17 
Social contributions/ total revenue 29,46 7,06 6,78 1,05 1,72 1,19 1,29 0,43 
School enrollment, secondary, fem. (% gross) 91,99 76,05 63,64 59,70 29,70 28,27 12,39 14,00 
Immunization, measles (% of children < 12 mo.) 90,50 89,19 92,86 76,40 62,80 65,14 58,40 78,75 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 72,32 69,57 70,30 44,17 53,74 56,90 46,32 41,30 
Illiteracy rate, youth total (% aged 15-24) 1,28 2,20 13,39 7,29 6,65 35,57 48,21 27,42 
 
 Argentina 
Belarus 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Israel 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Bolivia 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Iran 
Kazakhstan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Dominican Rep 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Jamaica 
Morocco 
Nicaragua  
Sri Lanka 
Botswana 
Kenya 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Zimbabwe 
Cameroon 
Congo, Rep. 
Ghana 
Indonesia 
Tanzania 
Bangladesh 
Cote d'Ivoire 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Papua N.G. 
Togo 
Benin 
Burundi 
Ethiopia 
Mali 
Senegal 
Mozambique 
Guinea-Bissau 
Rwanda 
Zambia 
Source: Data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
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 The main findings are as follows. 
Countries in cluster A exhibit some characteristics of Western welfare states and may 
be labelled proto-welfare states. These countries share in common relatively extensive state 
commitments to welfare provision and relatively effective delivery of services plus 
moderately extensive social security programmes and superior welfare outcomes (by, it must 
be stressed, the standards of the non-OECD world). Apart from Israel and Costa Rica, this 
cluster comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical antecedents: the countries of 
the former Soviet Union and its bloc members and the relatively industrialized countries of 
southern South America. Both developed European-style forms of social protection policies in 
the middle of the 20c, and both suffered degradation of these in the late 20c through the 
external imposition of neo-liberal programmes.  
Cluster B exhibits the second-best level of welfare outcomes and social service 
outputs with low levels of state social spending (and low reliance on external flows of aid and 
remittances). This interesting combination suggests that security and illfare are mitigated by 
fast-growing average incomes and/or by other domestic, non-state, informal institutions. This 
combination is found in three major world regions: i) China and most countries in East Asia 
from Korea through Thailand to Sri Lanka (except Indonesia, which dropped out of this group 
in 2000 having suffered most from the 1997 crisis); ii) the remaining countries of South and 
Central America not in cluster A; and iii) some countries in Western Asia (Iran, Turkey and 
Tajikistan).  
Countries in this group are mainly but not always low-middle income, with high 
growth rates, but are relatively undemocratic and unequal. They include some countries that 
have achieved historic reductions in poverty levels. One notable finding is that this cluster 
includes most countries of externally-induced, reactive modernization (Therborn’s fourth 
route to modernity), where states have been forced over longer periods to adjust to outside 
developmental pressures. This may indicate the presence of ‘developmental states’ with 
considerable infrastructure capacity but which have not prioritised traditional social policies. 
Here one might expect to see new forms of collective management of risk emerge. 
Cluster C is mainly distinguished by great reliance on remittances from abroad which 
account for 9% of gross national income on average and which constitute an informal 
functional alternative to public transfers. It comprises small countries in the Caribbean and 
Central America, plus Ecuador, Morocco and Sri Lanka. 
In southern and east Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Kenya) a distinct cluster D exhibited in 2000 relatively extensive public social policy (in both 
expenditures and outreach and literacy levels), but with poor health outcomes, due in large 
part to the HIV-AIDS pandemic.  
Cluster F, with at its core the countries of the Indian sub-continent - India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Nepal - exhibits high levels of illiteracy and low numbers of females in 
secondary education. These are by no means ‘failed states’: India is proclaimed as a future 
economic giant. Moreover, they boast a plethora of targeted social programmes and informal 
security mechanisms. However, the absence of effective schooling, health and social 
protection policies coupled with highly gendered outcomes, according to such indicators as 
the population sex ratio, betokens high levels of insecurity among the mass of the population.  
Clusters G and H, mainly countries in sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit low and in some 
cases falling life expectancy alongside relatively weak states with low levels of public 
responsibility, indicated both by spending levels and social outputs, and higher dependence on 
overseas aid. The prevalence of poverty is also high and persistent.  
 
2.4 Revenue Structures: A Cluster Analysis 
 
The relative size of total government revenue as a share of GDP has changed very 
little over the past decade and a half. Our focus here however is on cross-national variation at 
one point in time – around the year 2000. Its starting point is the tremendous heterogeneity of 
tax and revenue levels within the usual categories of countries, such as region or income level 
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or dependence on oil and minerals (Hinojosa et al 2008). Again, to grasp this heterogeneity 
we use cluster analysis. 
 
We distinguish the following major categories of government revenues: 
 
Total government revenue = taxes + social security contributions + other government 
revenues + grants from IGOs and foreign governments. 
 
To begin with we undertake a hierarchical cluster analysis of the four government 
revenues in the identity above. Using this, we then run a KCA with k=6, the results of which 
are presented in Table 2. The full outputs for this clustering are shown in the Appendix table, 
to indicate the information and the judgements involved. It identifies four clusters of countries 
where one form of revenue is dominant, and a fifth where this is not the case.  
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Table 2. Revenue clusters: Tax, social security, other revenues and aid 
 
High taxation/ 
gdp 
High social 
security/ gdp 
High other 
revenue/ gdp 
High aid/ gdp No dominant 
revenue 
source: all 
shares below 
average 
Kenya 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Papua  NG 
South 
Africa 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Zimbabwe  
Moldova 
Belarus 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Ukraine 
Uruguay  
Yemen, 
Rep. 
Botswana* 
Congo, 
Rep. 
Iran, 
Islamic 
Rep.  
Ethiopia 
Burundi 
Ghana 
Nicaragua 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Tajikistan 
Zambia  
Nepal 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
India 
Indonesia 
Kazakhstan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand  
59 countries, k-means cluster, k=6 
* originally a separate single-country cluster   
 
 
These clusters reveal the following:  
• Countries with relatively high levels of social security contributions are 
geographically clustered among the ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe and 
the ex-Soviet Union: all are in this cluster except for Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In 
addition there are three countries in Latin America - Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica - 
with relatively extensive social security contributions, which stand apart from the rest 
of the continent. 
• The cluster with substantial tax revenues is unexpectedly limited to just two world 
regions: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and southern and eastern Africa. 
Of the countries for which we have data every MENA country is in this group except 
for Yemen and Iran, and every country in southern and eastern Africa except 
Botswana. (In all these three other cases ‘other revenues’ dominate).  
• A greater relative reliance on overseas aid is mainly a feature of central and western 
sub-Saharan Africa: six of the nine countries in this region for which we have data 
fall into this cluster.  
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• However, the largest cluster comprises countries with no dominant source of 
government revenue. This includes all countries in East Asia and South Asia and the 
bulk of countries in Latin America. This is clearly a very heterogeneous group of 
countries, requiring further disaggregation (see below).3  
 
Three of the four countries in the small country cluster defined by high reliance on 
‘other revenues’ appear in the list of mineral rich countries of Hinojosa et al (2008): their 
export dependence ratios are Yemen (94%), Botswana (87%) and Iran (83%).  However, none 
of the other countries in their list are so identified by our cluster analysis. They identify 74 
countries whose level of export-dependence on minerals (fuels and metals) exceeded 10% in 
the period 1995-2005. Of these, 7 appear in our tax-dependent cluster, 5 in our aid-dependent 
cluster, 2 in our social security cluster, and 10 in the final cluster with no dominant source of 
revenue (for the remainder we do not have adequate data). Thus mineral-dependent 
economies appear more heterogeneous when other revenue sources are included in the 
analysis. However, it is notable that mineral-dependency is scarce among countries with 
higher levels of social security. This lends some support to the argument that external 
revenues act as barriers to the ‘revenue bargaining’ characteristic of social insurance.  
 
 
2.5 Welfare Regimes and Revenue Structures 
 
How do the welfare regime clusters map onto the new data on revenue structures 
presented above? To answer this we first present the mean level of tax and revenue shares for 
each country grouped according to our welfare regime clusters in Table 3.  
 
                                                 
3 When remittances are included in the cluster analysis the results are very similar – except for a separate cluster of 
countries highly dependent on remittances, already identified earlier.  
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Table 3. Shares of state revenue in GDP, by welfare regime 
 
 
 Total revenue 
Non-tax 
revenue Tax revenue 
Of which: 
Income tax 
Of which: 
Social security 
contributions 
       
A Argentina* 14 4.2 9.8 1.8 2.8 
 Belarus* 28.7 12.1 16.6 3.2 10.2 
 Brazil 24.3 12.1 12.2 5.1 8.5 
 Bulgaria 33.7 15.4 18.3 3.8 9.0 
 Costa Rica 20.9 8.8 12.1 2.7 7.0 
 Croatia 41.7 15.5 26.2 3.8 13.5 
 Estonia 28.3 12.3 16 3.5 9.6 
 Israel 42.8 11.8 31 14.3 6.6 
 Lithuania* 26 11.4 14.6 2.9 9.4 
 Poland 32.3 15.9 16.4 4.8 9.8 
 Romania 25.7 14 11.7 2.4 9.6 
 Tunisia 29.2 7.9 21.3 6.0 5.0 
 Ukraine 26.8 12.7 14.1 3.3 8.2 
 Uruguay 28 11.3 16.7 4.2 8.1 
 Cluster mean 28.7 11.8 16.9 4.4 8.4 
 S.D. 7.5 3.2 5.8 3.1 2.5 
       
B Bolivia** 18.4 5.2 13.2 1.2 1.6 
 Chile** 21.8 5.2 16.6 4.3 1.5 
 China 7.1 0.3 6.8 0.6 0.0 
 Colombia** 18.2 4.9 13.3 5.1 0.0 
 Iran, Islamic Rep** 23.5 17.1 6.4 3.2 2.7 
 Kazakhstan** 11.3 1.1 10.2 2.7 0.0 
 Korea, Rep. 23.3 7.2 16.1 6.1 3.1 
 Malaysia 19.2 4.9 14.3 7.9 0.2 
 Mexico* 14.8 3.1 11.7 5.0 1.5 
 Moldova 24.5 9.8 14.7 0.8 5.6 
 Paraguay 15.6 5.7 9.9 1.8 1.1 
 Peru** 17.2 4.9 12.3 3.3 1.2 
 Philippines 15.2 1.5 13.7 6.0 0.0 
 Tajikistan** 10.6 2.9 7.7 0.3 2.1 
 Thailand 19.5 4.1 15.4 5.6 0.8 
 Turkey 23.7 3.5 20.2 9.5 0.0 
 Cluster mean 17.7 5.1 12.7 4.0 1.3 
 S.D. 5.1 4.0 3.8 2.7 1.5 
       
C Dominican Rep. 16.8 2 14.8 3.0 0.8 
 Ecuador** 14.1 1.7 12.4  0.0 
 El Salvador 16 5.3 10.7  2.4 
 Jamaica** 33.2 8.5 24.7 10.3 1.3 
 Morocco 29.7 6.2 23.5 7.1 2.6 
 Nicaragua  18.4 4.6 13.8 2.0 2.5 
 Sri Lanka 16.8 2.3 14.5 2.1 0.3 
 Cluster mean 20.7 4.4 16.3 4.9 1.4 
 S.D. 7.5 2.5 5.5 3.7 1.1 
       
D Botswana** 45.3 30.2 15.1  0.0 
 Kenya* 20.1 1.3 18.8 5.1 0.0 
 Namibia* 32.7 2.7 30 10.4 0.2 
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 South Africa* 26.4 2.4 24 13.6 0.5 
 Zimbabwe* 29.5 3.1 26.4 12.5 0.8 
 Cluster mean 30.8 7.9 22.9 10.4 0.3 
 S.D. 9.3 12.5 5.9 3.8 0.3 
       
E Cameroon** 11.2 2.7 8.5  0.4 
 Congo, Rep.** 32.3 23.1 9.2  1.0 
 Ghana** 18 1.3 16.7  0.0 
 Indonesia* 18.2 4.4 13.8  0.4 
 Tanzania 0    0.0 
 Cluster mean 19.9 7.9 12.1  0.4 
 S.D. 8.9 10.2 3.9  0.4 
       
F Bangladesh 9.8 2.2 7.6 1.1 0.0 
 Cote d'Ivoire 16.6 2 14.6 3.8 1.4 
 India 12 3 9 3.2 0.0 
 Nepal 10.6 1.9 8.7 1.6 0.0 
 Pakistan 14 3.8 10.2 2.7 0.0 
 Papua New Guinea** 24.8 5.4 19.4 7.7 0.0 
 Togo     0.0 
 Cluster mean 14.6 3.1 11.6 3.4 0.2 
 S.D. 5.6 1.4 4.5 2.4 0.6 
       
G Benin     0.0 
 Burundi 17.9 2.5 15.4  1.2 
 Ethiopia 18.5 5.3 13.2  0.0 
 Mali     0.0 
 Senegal* 18.1 0.8 17.3  0.0 
 Cluster mean 18.2 2.9 15.3  0.3 
 S.D. 0.3 2.3 2.1  0.6 
       
H Mozambique**     
 Guinea-Bissau**     
 Rwanda* 10.6 1.5 9.1  0.2 
 Zambia** 19.1 0.7 18.4  0.0 
 Cluster mean 14.9 1.1 13.75  0.1 
Sources:  
All except last column: IMF Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM 1990-2007. 
Last column and all data for Poland, Korea, Mexico and Turkey: World Bank WDI Indicators 2008. 
This combination of data sources results in some anomalies; e.g. the sum of income tax and social security 
contributions slightly exceeds the figure for total tax revenues in the case of Brazil. 
 
Notes: 
Where data for 2000 not available, figures are taken from nearest available years: 
1994: Ecuador  
1996: Botswana 
1997: Zimbabwe 
1998: Brazil, Cameroon  
1999: Burundi, Zambia 
2001: Bangladesh, Chile, Congo Rep., Ghana, Indonesia  
2002: Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Romania 
2003: Colombia, Thailand 
2004: Togo 
2005: Benin, Paraguay 
 
Country** = over 30% dependence of exports on either minerals/ores, or fuels, or both. 
Country* = 10-29% dependence of exports on either minerals/ores, or fuels, or both. 
Source Hinojosa et al 2008, Tables 1a, 1b, 1c. 
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Table 4 summarises the mean values for the clusters together with their standard 
deviations (s.d.). Since there is considerable variation within some clusters, the results are 
also shown as box plots in Figure 3 for both total revenues (excluding overseas grants) – 3A - 
and tax revenues – 3B. The box-plots show the inter-quartile range as a box, and also enable 
us to identify outlying countries. 
 
Table 4. Welfare regimes: mean revenue sources 
 
Cluster identifier A B C D E F G H 
No of countries 14 16 7 5 5 7 5 4 
         
Tax/ GDP  16.9 12.7 16.3 22.9 12.1 11.6 15.3 
Non-tax rev/ GDP 11.8 5.1 4.4 7.9 7.9 3.1 2.9 
Total rev/ GDP 28.7 17.8 20.7 30.8 20.0 14.7 18.2 
Income tax 4.4 4.0 4.9 10.4 3.4  
Social contributions 8.4 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Income tax + social 
contributions 12.8 5.3 6.3 10.7 3.6  
Tax/ GDP s.d. 5.8 3.8 5.5 5.9 3.9 4.5 2.1 
Non-tax rev/ GDP s.d. 3.2 4.0 2.5 12.5 10.2 1.4 2.3 
Total rev/ GDP s.d. 7.5 5.1 7.5 9.3 8.9 5.6 0.3 
Source: Table 3. Mean values for cluster H are not provided because data on revenue 
sources is missing for half the countries. 
 
 
Figure 3a. Box plots of total government revenues by welfare regime 
Figure 3b. Box plots of tax revenues by welfare regime 
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We interpret these findings in the following stages.  
 
Total state revenues:  
There is a clear distinction between welfare regimes A and D and all others; for example, the 
revenues of the lower quartile of countries in A and D exceed the revenues of the upper 
quartile countries in all other clusters.  
• The proto-welfare states of cluster A are associated with greater government 
revenues, between 25-35% of GDP, as would be expected. Israel and Croatia are 
outliers with revenues over 40% of GDP, and Argentina is an outlier with 14% GDP.  
• But the anomalous high-spending/ low-security regime D in southern Africa also 
record high revenues, with Botswana showing revenues equal to 45 % GDP. 
• Regime B records considerably lower revenue shares, averaging 18% GDP (with 
China a notable outlier with 7% GDP). The average is similar to that of regime E, 
comprising Indonesia and four countries in central Africa. 
• Only in regime F centred on the Indian sub-continent do we find distinctly lower 
revenue shares – but the 3 percentage point difference between it and regime B is 
small compared with the wide differences in welfare outcomes.  
 
Government tax revenues: 
Focussing solely on governments’ abilities to raise tax revenues if anything diminishes the 
distinctiveness of our welfare regime clusters, with one exception: 
• Regime D now records by far the highest mean tax share, exceeding the tax take of 
regime A countries by six percentage points. (Interestingly Botswana now moves 
from upper outlier to lower outlier, though still recording a tax take of 15% of GDP). 
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• The proto-welfare states in cluster A record the second highest mean tax share of 17% 
GDP, with Israel and Croatia again featuring as high tax outliers.   
• However, there is a considerable overlap in tax takes between cluster A  and clusters 
B and C.  
• In Cluster B, there is considerable variation, with Turkey (20% GDP), Chile (17%) 
and Korea (16%) recording tax revenues higher than many in cluster A: the Gough-
Wood label of ‘informal security regime’ does not do full justice to such countries. At 
the other extreme, China records a remarkably low tax take of 7% GDP. 
• Regimes E, F and H exhibit tax levels lower or equal to those in B, with considerable 
overlap. Thus whatever it is that explains the superior welfare outcomes in cluster B, 
it is not their tax shares (though of course the absolute levels of tax raised are higher). 
 
Income tax revenues: 
When we narrow our focus further to revenues from income tax the mean levels of all the 
welfare regime clusters from A to F reveal remarkably few differences (ranging between 3 
and 5% GDP), apart from cluster D, where income taxation amounts to 10% of GDP on 
average. However, the standard deviations are everywhere high, suggesting that factors other 
than government income tax capacity are critical in discriminating between our welfare 
regimes (as we would expect).  
 
Social security contributions: 
It is only when we turn to revenues from social security contributions that the proto-welfare 
states of cluster A stand out with the average share exceeding 8% of GDP. In all other 
regimes their share is trivial.4 Here there is a clear link between welfare regime characteristics 
and one particular revenue source, as theories of welfare state financing would predict. 
 
State mineral revenues: 
Finally, Table 3 also picks out those countries dependent on oil and mineral revenues. Simply 
eye-balling the table reveals little pattern: countries with high mineral revenues are scattered 
across every welfare regime except for cluster A. The fact that none of the proto-welfare 
states are heavily mineral-dependent is worthy of further investigation. But outside this 
cluster there is no clear evidence of either a ‘resource curse’ or a resource bonanza effect. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The hypothesis that higher tax levels would be associated with greater state 
effectiveness in meeting welfare/security needs is not clearly borne out by this cluster 
analysis. It is only the scope of social security contributions that appears to correlate with 
proto-welfare states in the developing world. Here there is evidence of a link between a 
specific revenue source and proto-welfare state regimes. Moreover this cluster relies very 
little on revenues from minerals and oil. Apart from Israel and Costa Rica, this cluster 
comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical antecedents: the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and its bloc members and the relatively industrialized countries of 
southern South America.  
The fast-developing countries of East Asia and some other middle income countries 
in Latin America and MENA present an interesting anomalous picture in 2000. They exhibit 
relatively low shares of government revenue, taxes, income taxes and social security 
contributions, yet record relatively good social outputs and welfare outcomes. This suggests 
that security and illfare are mitigated by fast-growing average incomes and/or by other 
domestic, non-state, informal institutions. One notable finding is that this cluster includes 
most countries of externally-induced, reactive modernization (Therborn’s fourth route to 
                                                 
4 However, this is partly the result of including social contributions as share of revenue as one of the eight 
indicators used to identify the original welfare regime clusters. We address this issue below.  
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modernity), where states have been forced over longer periods to adjust to outside 
developmental pressures. This may indicate the presence of ‘developmental states’ with 
considerable infrastructure and steering capacity - but which have not prioritised traditional 
social policies. Here one might expect to see new forms of collective management of risk 
emerge. Indeed this can already be seen in some of the outliers in this group, such as Korea 
and Chile (and China). 
In contrast to this pattern, we observe a small group of countries in southern-eastern 
Africa with high spending and high tax revenues, but with poor welfare outcomes. This 
combination partly reflects the damaging effects of AIDS over the previous decade, but not 
entirely. It remains to be seen how effectively the government revenues have been deployed 
since 2000.  
Other world regions display low tax and expenditure levels, poor or ineffective social 
outputs and low welfare outcomes. In the case of much of sub-Saharan Africa this partly 
reflects the impact of the HIV-AIDS pandemic; further analysis of poverty outcomes is 
required to assess whether this is the major explanation. In the case of India and South Asia, 
wide gender differences and poor literacy rates are coupled with ineffective social 
programmes, notwithstanding high rates of economic growth. 
 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND CAUTIONS 
 
The literature review suggested that the “5 I’s” explanatory model of welfare states in 
the West also applies to the development of Western tax states and fiscal systems. However, it 
has less purchase in understanding welfare and revenue systems in the developing world. In 
the global South, the pattern of industrialisation, interest formation and representation, 
institutional development, ideational influences and the entire international environment are 
very different: more complex, variegated and heterogenous. Consequently, their ability to 
explain welfare and revenue systems is more indeterminate. 
This report recognises this heterogeneity by using cluster analysis to identify patterns 
in welfare regimes and revenue systems across the developing world. It analyses data for 65 
non-OECD countries (excluding micro-states) for the year 2000, covering welfare regimes, 
revenue structures, and the relationship between the two. 
The results suggest that the links between welfare and tax/revenue systems are indeed 
less robust across the developing world. It is only the scope of social security contributions 
that appears to correlate with proto-welfare states in the developing world. Here there is 
evidence of a link between a specific revenue source and proto-welfare state regimes.  
However, in interpreting these findings several caveats and limitations should be 
borne in mind.  
First, data available for a large number of countries are rarely capable of catching the 
detail we require to map either welfare regimes or state revenue systems. Thus we could find 
no valid, reliable and comparative measures of: privately provided pensions and services 
(except for health purchases); community and NGO-provided welfare; the role of households 
and wider kin groups, except for overseas remittances; and little on the role and influence of 
transnational actors, except aid donors. Given this unfortunate fact, we are reduced to 
inferring the nature of informal and insecurity regimes from the data that is available, to 
which we now turn. 
Second, our expenditure, output and outcome measures all centre around health and 
education: there are as yet no decent, regularly collected data on social protection 
expenditures across the developing world, let alone more subtle measures of mandation and 
tax expenditures. For example, social protection systems need not entail heavy state 
expenditures or revenues; they can be mandated by governments but administered privately, 
and the mandated contributions of employers and employees may not figure as government 
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revenues. Countries like Chile and Korea with such programmes are not picked up and 
therefore appear in the low spending cluster B. Nor will social protection necessarily be 
picked up by social insurance contributions - there has been a trend in recent years to expand 
social assistance and conditional cash transfers (CCTs). Again, we cannot even monitor 
regularised market provision across the world, enabling us to distinguish non-mandatory 
private insurance and out-of-pocket payments. The paucity of international data on social 
protection and welfare programmes is remarkable. 
Finally, the data we have used all refer to the year 2000: many new and expanded 
social programmes have emerged since then which do not figure here. 
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